സംവാദം:ബംഗാൾ ക്ഷാമം (1943)
തെറ്റിദ്ധരിപ്പിക്കുന്ന കാരണങ്ങൾ ആയതിനാൽ ആരെങ്കിലും വിവർത്തനം ചെയ്തു ചേർക്കുന്നതുവരെ ഇത് ഇവിടെ കിടക്കട്ടേ. "Bengal's economy was predominantly agrarian. For at least a decade before the crisis, between half and three quarters of those dependent on agriculture were already at near subsistence level. Underlying causes of the famine included inefficient agricultural practices, dense population, and de-peasantisation through debt bondage and land grabbing. Proximate causes comprise localised natural disasters (a cyclone, storm surges and flooding, and rice crop disease) and at least five consequences of war: initial, general war-time inflation of both demand-pull and monetary origin; loss of rice imports due to the Japanese occupation of Burma (modern Myanmar); near-total disruption of Bengal's market supplies and transport systems by the preemptive, defensive scorched earth tactics of the Raj (the "denial policies" for rice and boats); and later, massive inflation brought on by repeated policy failures, war profiteering, speculation, and perhaps hoarding. Finally, the government prioritised military and defense needs over those of the rural poor, allocating medical care and food immensely in the favour of the military, labourers in military industries, and civil servants. All of these factors were further compounded by restricted access to grain: domestic sources were constrained by emergency inter-provincial trade barriers, while access to international sources was largely denied by the War Cabinet of Great Britain. The relative impact of each of these contributing factors to the death toll and economic devastation is still a matter of controversy. Different analyses frame the famine against natural, economic, or political causes.
The government was slow to supply humanitarian aid, at first using propaganda to discourage hoarding. It attempted to drive rice paddy prices down through price controls and a series of procurement schemes. Price controls merely created a thriving black market and encouraged cautious sellers to withhold their stocks; moreover, prices soared when the controls were abandoned. Relief efforts in the form of gruel kitchens, agricultural loans and test works were both insufficient and ineffective through the worst months of the food crisis phase. Despite having a long-established and detailed Famine Code that would have triggered a sizable increase in aid, the provincial government never formally declared a state of famine. Relief efforts increased significantly when the military took control of crisis relief in October 1943, and more effective aid arrived after a record rice harvest that December. Deaths from starvation began to decline, but "very substantially more than half" of the famine-related fatalities were caused by disease in 1944, after the food security crisis had subsided"--Vinayaraj (സംവാദം) 08:19, 6 സെപ്റ്റംബർ 2017 (UTC)